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COMMENT
WHEN DOES eRA WFORD REACH JAILHOUSE PHONE
CALLS THAT IMPLICATE A CO-DEFENDANT, BUT ARE
MADE BY ANOTHER NON-TESTIFYING CO-DEFENDANT?
By: Matthew M. Grogan 1
INTRODUCTION

Amendment jurisprudence has been quite amorphous in the wake of
S theixth Supreme
Court's 2004 decision in Crawford v. Washington. This
2

comment will explore the present state of a criminal defendant's right to
confrontation while also introducing a potential, and most likely inevitable,
interpretation of law awaiting Maryland appellate courts: whether jailhouse
phone calls that are made by a non-testifying co-defendant and which
implicate another co-defendant are "testimonial" under Crawford and its
progeny.
The issue arises when one co-defendant, in exercising his or her right
against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment, effectively overrides
a fellow co-defendant's right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment.
Indeed, the precise issue is very fact specific, and has only been addressed by
a few jurisdictions at an appellate level. To date, all such cases have found
the calls in question to be non-testimonial. In addition to outlining the
rationale for such rulings, this comment will present valid counterarguments
as to why said calls are actually testimonial in nature.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

A. The Peculiar Relationship Between Hearsay and the Corifrontation
Clause
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendmenf and Article 21 of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights4 provide criminal defendants the right to

I I would like to thank Jerome Bivens, Esq. for suggesting the topic for this comment
and Professor Byron Warnken for serving as my faculty advisor. I would also like to
thank Brian Saccenti and Jennifer Caffrey of the Office of the Public Defender of
Maryland for their invaluable research assistance.
2541 U.S. 36 (2004).
3 U.S. CONST. amend. VI, § 2.
4 See Derr v. State, 434 Md. 88, 103,73 A.3d 254, 263 (2013) (noting that the
federal and Maryland right to confrontation are read "in pari materia, or as generally
providing the same protection to defendants."). For purposes of this article,
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cross-examine witnesses who bear testimony against the accused. 5 The rule
against hearsay, a cornerstone of federal and state evidentiary rules, prohibits
the admission of out-of-court statements that are offered "to prove the truth
of the matter asserted.,,6
The Sixth Amendment and hearsay are intrinsically linked; implication of
the right to confrontation necessarily involves the attempted use of an out-ofcourt statement offered for its truth. 7 Further, the rules of evidence allow for
numerous hearsay exceptions, which create a "natural tension" with the
strictures of the Confrontation Clause. 8
B. The Supreme Court Radically Altered Its Interpretation of the Sixth
Amendment in 2004

Prior to 2004, the Supreme Court's opinion in Ohio v. Roberts controlled
the realm of confrontation. 9 Under that standard, the admissibility of an outof-court statement hinged upon judicially determined "trustworthiness.,,10
Similar to the rationale supporting the validity of hearsay exceptions, a
defendant's right to confrontation would tum on the presence of certain
"indicia of reliability. ,,11
The watershed decision in Crawford v. Washington abrogated Roberts
and fundamentally changed Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. 12 Justice
Scalia's majority opinion sought to restore the state of confrontation,
consistent with the objectives of the Amendment's Framers. 13
therefore, discussion of the Sixth Amendment incorporates the rights granted by the
Maryland Constitution.
5 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 ("[The Confrontation Clause] applies to 'witnesses'
against the accused - in other words, those who 'bear testimony.' Testimony [is
defmed as a] 'solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing
or proving some fact. "') (internal citation omitted).
6 See FED. R. EVID. 802; MD. RULE 5-801(c).
7 Derr, 434 Md. at 106-07, 73 A.3d at 265 (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59-60 n.9)
("[T]he Confrontation Clause only applies to hearsay, or out-of-court statements
offered and received to establish the truth of the matter asserted.").
8 This is because an out-of-court statement has the potential to pass muster under a
hearsay exception, yet implicate a defendant's right to confrontation. See generally
The Honorable Paul W. Grimm, et. aI., The Confrontation Clause and the Hearsay
Rule: What Hearsay Exceptions Are Testimonial?, 40 U. BALT. L.F. 155 (2010)
(offering an in depth analysis of the interaction between the Confrontation Clause
and various exceptions to the rule against hearsay).
9 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
10 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60 (citing Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66) (criticizing the fact
that Roberts could be satisfied solely by the existence of a hearsay exception).
II Id. at 42; see also Grimm, supra note 8.
12 See Crawford, 541 U.S. 36.
13 See id. at 47-50 (alleging that Roberts was entirely inconsistent with the original
intent behind the Confrontation Clause's inclusion in the Bill of Rights). The
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The Court explained that cross-examination was the Framers' selected
mode of assessing the reliability of a given statement; in other words, it was
a "procedural guarantee" of reliability. 14 The problem with Roberts was that
it essentially interpreted the right to confrontation as a "substantive
guarantee" of reliability, leaving in the hands of the judiciary the task of
evaluating out-of-court statements under a plethora of factors on a case-bycase basis. 15 This led to unpredictable results and was inconsistent with the
crux of the Sixth Amendment - cross-examination.1 6
The principle concern the Framers sought to address was the use of ex
parte testimony or its functional equivalent in criminal trials. 17 That is,
testimony against a defendant made outside of that particuhu judicial
proceeding, offered as evidence at trial against the accused in lieu of the
declarant's in-court testimony.
In light of the Amendment's history and triggered by Roberts'
shortcomings, Crawford held that the Confrontation Clause bars admission
of "testimonial hearsay" unless the "declarant is unavailable,,18 and "the
defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine.,,19

C. The Ambiguous Definition of Testimonial
Ten years later, Crawford remains at the forefront of American
constitutional law. This is because the Court failed to carve out a
comprehensive definition of "testimonial,,,2o less describing three "core"
classes of "clearly" testimonial statements:

historic trial of Sir Walter Raleigh is today remembered for its impact on American
constitutional law; Sir Raleigh was convicted for treason and sentenced to death
despite demanding his right to confront his accusers in open court. Id. at 44. In
Crawford, the Court lambasted Roberts for effectively authorizing situations akin to
Sir Raleigh's case. Id. at 62; see infra Part VI.B.iv.
14/d. at 61.
15 I d.
16Id. at 65 ("It is not enough to point out that most of the usual safeguards of the
adversary process attend the statement, when the single safeguard missing is the one
the Confrontation Clause demands." (emphasis added».
17 See id. at 51.
18 See Grimm, supra note 8, at 189 and n.17 ("unavailable" is defmed in FED. R.
EVID. 804(a) and MD. RULE 5-804(a); a declarant is unavailable in situations in
which a privilege precludes in-court testimony).
19 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59.
2° Id. at 68 ("We leave for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive
definition of 'testimonial.' Whatever else the term covers, it applies at a minimum
to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial;
and to police interrogations. These are the modem practices with closest kinship to
the abuses at which the Confrontation Clause was directed."),
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[E]x parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalentthat is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations,
prior testimony that the defendant was unable to crossexamine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would
reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially; . . . contained
in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits,
depositions, prior testimony, or confessions; ... statements
that were made under circumstances which would lead an
objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement
would be available for use at a later tria1. 21

Statements made to police during the course of an interrogation are
testimonial under all three definitions, because "[a]n accuser who makes a
formal statement to government officers bears testimony in.a sense that a
person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not.,,22
Although not an exhaustive list of testimonial statements, the three core
classes all support the conclusion that a testimonial statement is one in which
a reasonable declarant would foresee as being available for later use at trial.
This is the essence of Crawford.
D. The Primary Purpose Test

The Supreme Court decided Washington v. Davis and expounded on its
defmition of "testimonial" two years after its decision in Crawford. 23 In
Davis, the Court held that the "primary purpose" ofa 911 call was to respond
to an "ongoing emergency," and not to acquire evidence for a later
prosecution?4 Thus the statement was non-testimonial and admissible, as its
primary purpose was not evidentiary in nature. 25 In contrast, the subsequent
affidavit given to police at the scene of an alleged domestic incident was
testimonial where there was no ongoing emergency at the time the statement
.
26
was gIven.
Simply put, the relevant distinction between the phone call that reported a
domestic assault and the subsequent statement to police on-scene was that
the 911 call concerned "what is happening" (more likely non-testimonial),
whereas the battery affidavit pertained to "what happened" (more likely
testimonial).27

21 Id. at 51-52 (internal citations omitted).
22Id. at 51-53.
23

547 U.S. 813 (2006) (overruling Hammon v. Indiana, 546 U.S. 976 (2005».
Washington v. Davis, 547 U.S. at 828.
2S Id. at 814-15.

24

26Id.
27Id. at 829-30. Maryland courts have also held that a statement on a 911 recording
was non-testimonial, while a subsequent statement made to police at a hospital
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E. A Dual Perspective
The primary purpose test in Davis was somewhat ambiguous because the
Court suggested, but did not state definitively, "that both the declarant's
intent and the interrogator's motives [were] relevant considerations.,,28 Any
such confusion was clarified by the Court in 2011.
In Michigan v. Bryant, a shooting victim's statement to responding
officers was deemed non-testimonial in light of an apparent ongoing
emergency.29 Substantial weight was given to the perception of both the
declarant and the interrogator. 3o The Court explained that the existence of an
emergency is a fact-dependent inquiry.31
The level of formality surrounding the statement's making was also
relevant. Statements made during the course of an ongoing emergency are
usually "frantic," and are clearly "distinguishable from the formal stationhouse interrogation in Crawford. ,,32
F. The Right to Confrontation in Maryland

The Maryland decision most akin to this comment's topic is Cox v.
State. 33 The case was decided subsequent to Michigan v. Bryant and
therefore reflects Maryland's interpretation of the current version of the
Supreme Court's primary purpose inquiry.34
The issue in the case was whether a statement made by a co-defendant to
a fellow inmate while incarcerated was testimonial under Crawford. 35 The
court determined that the statement was non-testimonial and admissible
because it was a casual remark between mere acquaintances that was not
made under circumstances objectively indicating that it would be available

following the alleged incident was testimonial. See Grimm, supra note 8, at 163
(discussing Marquardt v. State, 164 Md. App. 95, 882 A.2d 900 (2005».
28 Shari H. Silver, Michigan v. Bryant: Returning to an Open-Ended Confrontation
Clause Analysis, 71 MD. L. REv. 545,555 (2012).
29 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1147 (2011).
30/d. at 1160-62.
31Id. at 1158.
32 I d. ("[T]he questioning in this case occurred in an exposed, public area, prior to
the arrival of emergency medical services, and in a disorganized fashion.") (internal
citations omitted).
33421 Md. 630,28 A.3d 687 (2011).
34 See id. As will be explained, the present state of the primary purpose test is quite
uncertain, as a four-Justice plurality of the Supreme Court recently proposed a
modification that the other five Justices strongly denounced; therefore, Cox and
Bryant still constitute good law today. See infra Parts IV.A, IV.B.iv.
35 Cox, 421 Md. at 636, 28 A.3d at 690.
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for later evidentiary use. 36 In so holding, the court distinguished statements
made to government personnel, and statements between private parties. 37
The court found the analysis in United States v. Smalls "particularly
enlightening.,,38 There, the Tenth Circuit admitted a statement made to an
inmate who was serving as a governmental informant, solely because the
declarant was unaware of the informant's status. 39 Therefore, objectively
viewed from the perspective of the declarant, the statement was not for the
primary purpose of establishing facts for a later prosecution, and was "more
akin to casual remarks to an acquaintance than formal declarations to an
official. ,,40
However, what Cox failed to mention was that Smalls was decided prior
to Bryant. The Tenth Circuit did not have to consider the perspective of all
parties involved in the statement's making. Indeed, what was interesting
about Cox was its application of Bryant. 41 Although the court acknowledged
that Bryant considered the perspective of all parties involved, the court's
opinion nonetheless turned exclusively on an objective declarant standard. 42
In short, because the declarant's statements were spontaneous and against
penal interest, between casual acquaintances in a non-formal setting, the
court held that the statements were not made for the "primary purpose of
creating a substitute for trial testimony.,,43
Cox is relevant to jailhouse phone calls because both scenarios involve
correspondence between private parties in a jailhouse context that is not the
product of an official interrogation. However, as will be presented infra,
pointed differences exist between cases like Cox and the phone calls at issue
herein.
III. JAILHOUSE PHONE CALLS: THE NEXT CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
DILEMMA?

The principal focus of this article is quite fact specific. Even still, it may
be analyzed in a variety of ways due to the Sixth Amendment's continued
evolution.

36Id. at 651, 28 A.3d at 699.
37Id. at 642-51, 28 A.3d at 694-99.
38Id. at 647, 28 A.3d at 697 (citing United States v. Smalls, 605 F.3d 765, 779-80
(10th Cir. 2010».
39Id.
40 I d.
41 See Cox, 421 Md. at 648-50,28 A.3d at 697-99 (citing Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143).
42 I d. (reflecting that Maryland attributes more weight to a declarant's point of view).
It is arguable, therefore, that a declarant-driven approach is still available to
Maryland practitioners.
43 Cox, 421 Md. at 651, 28 A.3d at 699 (quoting Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89
(1970».

166

University of Baltimore Law Forum

[Vol. 44.2

Whether jailhouse phone calls made by a non-testifying co-defendant that
are incriminating against another co-defendant are testimonial under
Crawford and its progeny may vary on a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction basis.
Although the consensus to date indicates a tendency to view said phone calls
as non-testimonial, this comment will argue that, if presented with the right
fact pattern, Maryland should hold differently.44
In fact, the issue has already reared its head in the trial courts of
Maryland. The following will introduce a 2012 case out of the Circuit Court
for Baltimore City in which certain jailhouse phone calls were admitted
under Crawford in a joint criminal trial of Hugh Wade and Donnie Adams.

A. Jailhouse Phone Calls Before the 2012 Case ofHugh Wade
i. The Ninth Circuit
In 2007, a defendant appealed his conviction for robbery on the grounds
that his right to confrontation was violated when a non-testifying codefendant's jailhouse phone call was admitted at a joint criminal tria1. 45 In
Saechao v. Oregon, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the lower court's finding that the phone call was non-testimonial, as
the call was voluntarily between two casual acquaintances without any active
governmental participation. 46 Of particular emphasis was the fact the
declarant was not attempting to "minimize his own guilt or shift the
blame.,,47

ii. The First Circuit
In 2010, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit cited
Saechao and concluded that a non-testifying co-defendant's jailhouse phone
call was non-testimonial and admissible against another co-defendant. 48
Specifically, in United States v. Castro-Davis, the defendant asserted error in
the phone call's admission because the co-defendant was "repeatedly

44 If a co-defendant's jailhouse phone call is deemed testimonial in a joint criminal
trial, the Supreme Court's decision in Bruton v. United States is implicated. 391
U.S. 123 (1968). However, Bruton can essentially be disregarded for purposes of
this paper, as it is only applicable after an out-of-court statement has been deemed
testimonial. United States v. Castro-Davis, 612 F.3d 53, 65 (1st Cir. 2010) ("[T]he
Bruton rule does not apply to non-testimonial hearsay statements.") (internal citation
omitted). See also supra Part VI.B.vi.
45 Saechao v. Oregon, 249 Fed.App'x 678,679 (9th Cir. 2007).
46 Id. (reflecting that the calls were not non-testimonial as a matter of law; rather, the
court determined that is was merely acceptable, i.e., "not unreasonable," for the
lower court to label them as such).
47Id.
48 Castro-Davis, 612 F.3d at 65.
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warned" that his conversation was being recorded and had even mentioned
during the call that he could not say much over the phone. 49 The defendant
argued that the co-defendant's statement was testimonial because a
reasonable person would perceive the statement's potential for later
evidentiary use. 50
The First Circuit disagreed and affirmed the defendant's conviction.
Similar to the Ninth Circuit in Saechao, the court in Castro-Davis
emphasized the difference between a statement made to a close family
member, in contrast to a statement made in response to governmental
questioning. 5 I

B. Jailhouse Phone Calls in Maryland
In July of 2011, Hugh Wade was observed by a Baltimore City detective
engaging in an apparent hand-to-hand drug transaction. 52 Shortly thereafter,
the vehicle in which Wade was traveling was pulled over. 53 When officers
asked Wade to step out of the vehicle he fled and escaped. 54 The driver, codefendant Adams, consented to a search of the vehicle, which revealed a
loaded handgun discovered within a shopping bag. 55
Eventually, Wade and Adams were both charged with the prohibited
possession of a firearm. 56 Prior to their joint trial in the Circuit Court for
Baltimore City, the State moved in limine to admit a recorded phone
conversation that Adams had made while incarcerated. 57 The contents of the
recording were incriminating as to Wade, and the State moved to have the
evidence admitted against both defendants on the grounds that the pertinent
statements were non-testimonial. 58
Id. at 64-65. This is the case with most, ifnot all jailhouse phone calls; when
inmates make a call from jail, an automated recording states that the call is subject to
monitoring. See infra note 58.
.
50 Castro-Davis, 612 F.3d at 64-65.
51 d.
I
52 State's Motion in limine to Admit Defendant's Jail Call Statements at 2, State v.
Adams et ai., Nos. 11217015 and 211273009 (Feb. 17,2012) [hereinafter "State's
Motion in Wade"] (explaining that Wade exited a vehicle to conduct the transaction,
and then left the scene in the same vehicle that he arrived in).
53 Id. at 3.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56Id. at 1.
57 See id.
58 State's Motion in Wade at 1,3,6. A transcript of the phone call indicated that codefendant Adams was warned that his statement was being recorded, and also
revealed that Adams was upset with co-defendant Wade:
49

Recording:

You have a collect call from "Donnie" an inmate
at the Baltimore Central Booking, an intake
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The State argued that the statements were the product of a casual
conversation between private acquaintances without any direct governmental
involvement. 59 The State acknowledged that the facts of Wade were
inapposite to the facts of Cox, but nonetheless implored the court to apply
Cox and conclude that the jailhouse recording was non-testimonial because it
was an informal statement that was not elicited in response to governmental
questioning, nor was it a statement in which a reasonable declarant would
foresee its later availability at tria1. 60
At the motions hearing the trial judge focused the inquiry on the
substance of Adams' statement, specifically whether Adams was trying to
negate personal guilt and/or shift blame towards Wade. 61 In that regard, the
State argued that it would be absurd to conclude that Adams intended to shift
blame towards Wade, in light of the fact that the statement did not expressly
mention Wade by name, and was in substance, against Adams' own penal
62
interest.
Ultimately, the circuit court would grant the State's motion. 63 The
reasons for doing so were twofold. First, the trial judge did not believe that
Adams intended to bear witness against Wade, in part because Adams did
not explicitly name Wade. 64 Alternatively, the court opined that "[e]ven if

Adams:

Male:
Adams:
Male:
Adams:

center. This call is subject to recording and
monitoring ...
. . . the whole day I got him hanging with me. So
you know how [he] is he got that joint in his
pocket the whole time. And all of a sudden. Yo.
Whats up now I'm thinking he still got it and he
ain't got it. Come on now.
So where did he put it? On his side or
something?
No. In the bag with the polos.
Oh ok, ok, ok. Damn yo.
Dumb shit. Do you know how mad I was yo.

Id. at 11. In its motion in limine, the State concluded that Adams was referring to
Wade and that the ')oint" referred to the recovered firearm. Id. at 3.
59 I d. at 9.
60 Transcript of Motions Hearing at 20-21, State v. Wade, (2012) (No. 211273009).
61Id. at 22.
62Id. at 23-24.
63 Jd. at 39.
64 Id. In fact, the trial judge concluded that Adams' statement was not inculpatory
against Wade. Id. ("It's not inculpatory because it turns out that Wade didn't have
the handgun on him, Adams had it in his car."). However, this conclusion is plainly
erroneous and it will not be addressed further in this comment. See United State v.
Dargan, 738 F.3d 643,649 (quoting Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594,603
(1994)) (statements are "intrinsically inculpatory to the extent they demonstrate
knowledge of 'significant details about the crime. "').
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Adams had intended to or did expect to use the phone call to direct the police
to Wade, Adams is not exculpated from any of the handgun charges.,,65
Therefore, the fact that the statement was against Adams' own penal interest
was dispositive of its non-testimonial character, as applied to Wade's right to
confrontation. 66

C. 2012 Counterarguments to the Rule in Wade
The case of Hugh Wade serves as an example of how the issue of
jailhouse phone calls is presently being handled in the trial courts of
Maryland. After granting the State's motion the case proceeded as if Adams'
statement would be offered at trial against Wade. Eventually, a guilty plea
was entered that effectively waived Wade's right to appeal. 67
The following section will provide valid assertions in opposition to the
circuit court's grant of the pertinent pretrial motion in Wade. Arguments will
be presented as to why the motion was incorrectly granted at the time of its
ruling and under the authority cited therein by the State.68 While general
arguments will be presented that pertain to "typical" scenarios involving codefendants and jailhouse phone calls, it is important to bear in mind that the
Confrontation Clause is required to be interpreted on a case-by-case basis. 69
i. Cox is inapposite to the facts of Wade
Cox v. State was the sole case of comparison utilized during the portion of
the pretrial hearing that dealt with Wade's Sixth Amendment rights. 70 The
trial judge applied the Cox definition of a testimonial statement and
analogized the facts of Wade with the pertinent facts in Cox. 7l Co-defendant
Adams' statements were likened to those in Cox because both were "more
akin to casual remarks to acquaintances than formal declarations to an
official."n Additionally, both statements were self-inculpatory, and "were

65 Transcript of Motions Hearing at 39, State v. Wade, (2012) (No. 211273009).
66

Id

67 Case Number 211273009, MD. JUDICIARY CASE SEARCH,
http://casesearch.courts.state.md.us/inquiry/inquiry-index.jsp (follow "Continue"
hyperlink, then search "Court" for "Baltimore City Circuit Court" and search "Case
Number" for "211273009," then follow "Get Case" hyperlink).
68 This comment is not intended to suggest that the trial court was undoubtedly in
error when it granted the State's motion. The facts of the case surely provide for a
close call. The following simply provides the arguments that could have been made
by the defendant, had the case presented itself for appellate review.
69 See Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1156 (2011).
70 Transcript of Motions Hearing at 37-39, State v. Wade, (2012) (No. 211273009).
71Id
72 !d. at 37.
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not made for the primary purpose of creating a substitute for trial
testimony." 73
Again, however, pointed differences exist that would justify
distinguishing Wade from Cox in order to find the jailhouse phone call of codefendant Adams testimonial. The primary difference is the irrefutable fact
that inmates are aware that their calls from jail are recorded. 74 This makes
the scenario more akin to statements made to State actors, rather than casual
conversations with private acquaintances.
Indeed, Cox involved a statement between inmates that was made
completely unbeknownst to any sort of governmental involvement. 75
Although it is logical to state that a reasonably prudent inmate, speaking in
private with another inmate, would not expect his or her statement to be later
available for use at trial, this assumption is borderline nonsensical when
applied to jailhouse phone calls in which inmates are notified, every time
they make a call, that it is being monitored. 76
In sum, while there may be other justifications supporting the Circuit
Court for Baltimore City's ruling in Wade, simply applying Cox and resting
on the alleged similarities of the two fact patterns should not have survived
appellate scrutiny, if the case would have made it that far.
ii. Application of the primary purpose test
Michigan v. Bryant was the controlling case at the time the court granted
the State's motion in Wade. 77 The post-Bryant primary purpose test has been
interpreted as defining a testimonial statement as one that is made with the
primary purpose of providing evidence. 78 A straight-forward application of
this standard suggests that Co-Defendant Adams' statements were
testimonial in nature.
The main reason for this conclusion is again an inmate's knowledge that
jailhouse phone calls are monitored. Inmates often talk cryptically and
occasionally acknowledge, as did the declarant in Castro-Davis, the need to
73Id.
74 See supra note 49,58.
75 Cox, 421 Md. At 647, 28 A.3d at 697 (citing United States v. Smalls, 605 F.3d
765, 779-80 (10th Cir. 2010».
76 See supra note 49, 58.
77 See supra Part ILE.
78 See Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2273-74 (2012) (Kagan, J., dissenting)
("We have previously asked whether a statement was made for the primary purpose
of establishing 'past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution' - in
other words, for the purpose of providing evidence.") (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at
822) (emphasis added); see also id. at 2261 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[F]or a
statement to be testimonial within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause, the
declarant must primarily intend to establish some fact with the understanding that his
statement may be used in a criminal prosecution.").
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be careful of what is said on the recording. 79 Therefore, when an inmate
provides information regarding criminal activity despite such knowledge, it
follows that the statement's primary purpose is evidentiary in nature.
One could also argue that the government's primary purpose in recording
jailhouse phone calls is investigatory in nature, on the grounds that
correctional facilities routinely monitor inmates' phone calls in an attempt to
assist in the prosecution of same. 80 However, in Cox, the Court of Appeals
of Maryland applied a declarant-driven approach without much consideration
of the point of view of the State; thus the scope of Bryant's dual perspective
in Maryland is presently unclear. 81
Timing was also an important factor in Bryant. 82 A statement describing
events as they are actually occurring is more likely to be non-testimonial,
whereas a statement describing past events is more likely to be for the
primary purpose of providing evidence. 83 Given the custodial nature of a
jailhouse, many of the relevant phone calls will pertain to past events, as was
the case in Wade. 84
iii. Due to co-defendant Adams' acrimonious tone, too much emphasis
was placed on the statement's self-inculpatory nature
It may be argued that it was error for the Circuit Court for Baltimore City
to conclude that Adams' statement was non-testimonial because it was
against his penal interest. 85 This is because, viewed as a whole, the relevant
recording demonstrates ill will on behalf of Adams in regard to Wade. 86 As
such, Wade is distinguishable from Cox, Saechao, and Castro-Davis, as codefendant Adams' statement can be viewed as a clear attempt to shift blame
and negate guilt. 87
In Saechao, the declarant stated, "too bad I happen to have been with him
that night.,,88 This was not an attempt to shift blame and was against the
declarant's penal interest. 89 Relatedly, the declarant in Cox did not

See Castro-Davis, 612 F.3d at 64-65.
But see infra note 177.
81 See Cox, 421 Md. at 647, 28 A.3d at 697.
82 See supra note 28.
83 Davis, 547 U.S. at 829-30.
84 See supra note 58. Theoretically, an exception to this general notion could
involve cases where inmates are conducting illegal operations over the phone while
incarcerated, such as selling drugs.
85 Transcript of Motions Hearing at 39, State v. Wade, (2010) (No. 211273009).
86 See supra note 58.
87 See supra Parts II.F, III.A.
88 Saechao v. Oregon, 249 F.App'x 678, 679 (9th Cir. 2007).
89 See id.
79

80
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demonstrate any animus towards the respective defendant, who was actually
party to the pertinent jailhouse conversation. 90
Clearly, this differs from Wade, where co-defendant Adams made the
pertinent phone call outside of Wade's presence while well aware that his
statement was being recorded. 91 Moreover, Adams' statement was a clear
attempt to shift blame, as he essentially claimed that the recovered ftrearm
was Wade's exclusively, and that he only consented to a search because he
was under the impression that the weapon was in Wade's possession and no
longer in the vehicle. 92
The State avoided Adams' apparent animus in its motion in limine by
focusing on the fact that the statement reflected Adams' own "consciousness
of guilt.,,93 This supported a non-testimonial ftnding because a reasonable
declarant would not typically make a statement against their own penal
interest where there is the potential for its later use at tria1. 94
However, considering Adams' situation in its entirety yields a conclusion
contrary to the position advocated by the State and eventually accepted by
the court. 95 The facts underlying Adams' position at the time of his phone
call were not in his favor, as a handgun was discovered in his possession at
the time of his arrest. 96 Thus he was unlikely to escape prosecution
unscathed, whereas at that point Wade had not even been charged after
having fled and escaped. 97
It can be argued that this reality was reflected in Adams' negative tone.
Although the court relied on the fact that the recording was, in part, selfinculpatory, that does not change the overall and plain language
interpretation of the statement: Adams was rather upset because a ftrearm
that allegedly belonged to Wade was discovered in the vehicle that Adams
was driving. 98

Cox, 421 Md. at 651, 28 A.3d at 699.
See supra note 58.
92Id. (reflecting that Adams' stated: "[w]hats up now I'm thinking he still got it and
he ain't got it"); State's Motion in Wade at 3; Transcripts of Motions Hearing at 3739, State v. Wade, (2012) (No. 211273009).
93 State's Motion in Wade at 2.
94 See id. at 7.
95 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 66 ("[E]ven if the assessment ofthe officer's ['neutral']
motives was accurate, it says nothing about Sylvia'S perception of her situation.
Only cross-examination could reveal that.") (emphasis added).
96 State's Motion in Wade at l.
97 Id. In other words, it is arguable that Adams intended to "shift blame" because he
was of the mindset that he had nothing to lose by making a statement against his own
penal interest, while simultaneously extracting some vengeance against Wade. See
supra Part lILA.
98 See supra note 58.
90

91
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More simply put, the inculpatory nature of the statement, while
potentially relevant to a Crawford analysis, was given far too much weight in
light of the actual circumstances present at the time. 99
IV. THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE IN THE CONTEXT OF FORENSIC REpORTS

The remainder of this comment will discuss the state of confrontation in
Maryland and at the federal level subsequent to the case of Hugh Wade.
Though the foregoing section analyzed Wade from a 2012 point of view, this
article will conclude with 2014 recommendations, while also discussing how
a court could address a case like Wade today. To do so, a recent hot topic in
Sixth Amendment jurisprudence must be discussed - forensic reports. 100
In the 2009 case of Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, the Supreme Court
addressed the admissibility of a "certificate of analysis" that outlined a lab
report's conclusions and certified the report's accuracy and authenticity.lol
The certificate was offered at trial in lieu of the live testimony of the analyst
who conducted the testing, in order to show that the substance allegedly
possessed by the defendant was cocaine. 102 The Court held that the lab
report's conclusions were inadmissible absent the in-court testimony of the
analyst who compiled the report. 103 The Court viewed the certificate as an
affidavit, "functionally identical to live, in-court testimony, doing 'precisely
what a witness does on direct examination. ",104
In 2011, the principles of Melendez-Diaz were affirmed in Bullcoming v.
New Mexico. 105 There, the lab report at issue pertained to a defendant's
blood alcohol content. The State did not call the author of the signed report
to testify, but rather had a "surrogate" witness take the stand and recite the
report's fmdings. 106 The Court held, as it did in Melendez-Diaz, that the
report was testimonial because its primary purpose was clearly
evidentiary. 107

See supra notes 65-66.
See, e.g., Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009); Bullcoming v.
New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011).
101 Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 308.
102 !d.
103 !d. at 310-11.
104 Id. (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 830).
105 Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2707.
106 I d. at 2715.
107Id. at 2717 ("In all material respects, the laboratory reports in this case resembles
those in Melendez-Diaz.").
99

100
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A. The Supreme Court's Latest Interpretation of the Sixth Amendment

The Supreme Court's latest substantive interpretation of the right to
confrontation came in June 2012. 108 Once again, the Court was faced with
assessing the constitutionality of introducing forensic reports via surrogate
testimony. 109
The specific issue in Williams v. Illinois was whether a defendant's right
to confrontation was violated when the trial court admitted "basis testimony"
by a police forensics expert. 110 Basis testimony is a type of surrogate
testimony in which an expert forms an opinion that is "based" on some
external data, even if the underlying data is inadmissible in and of itself. III
The police expert testified during a bench trial that the defendant's DNA
matched a sample taken from a rape victim and analyzed at an outside
laboratory.112 The defendant argued that it constituted testimonial hearsay
for the expert to base her 0ginion on the conclusions of a report in which she
took no part in compiling. 1 3
A bitterly divided Court affirmed the Illinois state courts' finding that the
Sixth Amendment was not violated by the admission of the expert's
testimony.114 Justice Thomas, whose opinion helped create the very narrow
holding that the pertinent statement was non-testimonial, concurred in
judgment only, on grounds wholly incongruent with that of the plurality.1I5
As such, Williams serves as a prime example of the oscillatory nature of
today's Confrontation Clause.
The plurality sided with the state courts on two alternative grounds: (1)
the Confrontation Clause was not implicated because the expert's basis was
not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted;1l6 (2) and even if the
108 Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012).
109

See supra note 100.

110 Williams, 132 S. Ct. 2221.
III Id. at 2233-35 (plurality opinion). This presents an issue because the expert
lacked personal knowledge of the opinion's underlying "basis," and thus a criminal
defendant is unable to cross-examine the declarant as to the validity of the basis of
the expert opinion. !d. at 2269 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
112 Id. at 2222-23 (plurality opinion).
113 Id. at 2223 (plurality opinion).
114Id.
115 See id. at 2255-56 (Thomas, J., concurring) (agreeing with the plurality that the
lab report was non-testimonial, but also sharing the "dissent's view of the plurality's
flawed analysis"); see also id. at 2265 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (characterizing the
plurality opinion as, in essence, a dissent because "[f]ive Justices specifically reject
every aspect of its reasoning and every paragraph of its explication").
116 Id. at 2240. The Confrontation Clause applies solely to out-of-court statements
that qualify as hearsay. See supra note 7. Under state evidentiary law, basis
testimony is not admissible for its truth; the Williams plurality was influenced by this
and the fact the case involved a bench trial, asserting that judges are presumed to
understand such subtleties in the rules of evidence. Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2234-35
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report was offered for its truth, the Confrontation Clause was not violated
because the underlying basis, i.e., the DNA report, was non-testimonia1. 117
i. A very narrow holding
The holding of Williams is limited because the plurality's "not-for-itstruth" rationale was rejected by a majority of the COurt;IIS thus the holding is
simply that the Confrontation Clause was not violated because the
underlying DNA analysis was non-testimonia1." 9 This was the shared view
of the plurality and Justice Thomas. 120 Though reached on completely
different grounds, the end result was a five-Justice majority holding that the
Sixth Amendment was not offended by the State's use of surrogate
testimony. 121
At first glance, the outcome seems to contradict Melendez-Diaz and
Bullcoming, where certain forensic reports were deemed testimonia1. 122
However, both the plurality and Justice Thomas distinguished Williams from
past case law, concluding that the differing outcomes were entirely consistent
with one another. 123 The dissent vehemently disagreed. 124

(plurality opinion). However, this conclusion was hotly contested by Justice
Thomas's concurrence and the four Justices in dissent, i.e., a majority of the Court.
The plurality was accused of inappropriately allowing evidentiary rules to trump
constitutional rights. Id. at 2256 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[W]e have recognized
that concepts central to the application of the Confrontation Clause are ultimately
matters of federal constitutional law that are not dictated by state or federal
evidentiary rules."); id. at 2272 (Kagan, J., dissenting) ("[W]e do not typically allow
state law to define federal constitutional requirements.").
117 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2242 (plurality opinion).
liS See supra note 116.
119 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2226 (plurality opinion).
120 See id.
121 See id. at 2244. When construing the decision based on a five justice majority,
regardless of specific rationale, the outcome in Williams is twofold: (1) the expert's
testimony triggered consideration of the Sixth Amendment regardless of applicable
evidentiary rules as its underlying "basis" was offered for its truth and equated to
hearsay (per Justice Thomas's concurrence and the four dissenting Justices); (2)
though implicated, the defendant's right to confrontation was not violated as the
underlying DNA report was non-testimonial (per Justice Thomas's concurrence and
the four-Justice plurality).
122 Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 310-11; Bul/coming, 131 S. Ct. At 2707.
123 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2240 (plurality opinion); id. at 2260 (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
124 See infra note 140.
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ii. The plurality's rationale for finding the lab report non-testimonial
What is most noteworthy in Williams is the plurality's modification of the
primary purpose test, in which a novel ingredient was added to the analysis, a
factor that, when absent, was alleged to be dispositive of a statement's nontestimonial character. 125 However, as was the case with the plurality's "notfor-its-truth" conclusion, five Justices of the Court expressly rejected the
proposed alteration to what heretofore had been the primary purpose test of
Michigan v. Bryant. 126
In order to distinguish Williams from Bul/coming and Melendez-Diaz, the
plurality summarized the post-Crawford Confrontation Clause as applying to
formalized statements that have the "primary purpose of accusing a targeted
individual of engaging in criminal conduct.,,127 The plurality reasoned that
the forensic reports in Bul/coming and Melendez-Diaz had a primary purpose
of targeting a specific individual, whereas the lab report in Williams was
compiled long before the defendant was identified as a suspect. 128
Williams serves as the first instance in which the Court explicitly
mentioned a "particular individual" aspect of the primary purpose test. 129
For this reason, among others, five Justices rejected the proposed
modification, which has been dubbed the "accusation" test. 130
iii. The concurrence's rationale for finding the lab report nontestimonial.
Justice Thomas has established himself as a recluse in his Sixth
Amendment analysis. 131 He has filed concurring opinions in many of the
Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2242-43 (plurality opinion).
See infra note 129; see also supra note 34.
127 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2242 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
128 Id. at 2243 (plurality opinion) (internal citations omitted); but see id. at 2262
(Thomas, J., concurring) ("[T]he text of the Confrontation Clause does not constrain
the time at which one becomes a 'witness' .... Historical practice confirms that a
declarant could become a 'witness' before the accused's identity was known.").
129 See id. at 2262 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[The plurality's] test lacks any
grounding in constitutional text, in history, or in logic . "); id. at 2274 (Kagan, J.,
dissenting) ("None of our other cases have suggested that, in addition, the statement
must be meant to accuse a previously identified individual; indeed, in MelendezDiaz, we rejected a related argument that laboratory 'analysts are not subject to
confrontation because they are not 'accusatory' witnesses. "') (internal citations
omitted).
130 See id.; see also infra Part IV.B.iv (further discussing the problems with the
"accusation" test).
131 See, e.g., Derr v. State, 434 Md. 88, 142, 73 A.3d 254, 286 (2013) (Eldridge, J.,
dissenting) ("The opening paragraph of Justice Thomas's Williams· opinion also
referred to his previous concurring opinion in Michigan v. Bryant, also an opinion
which no other Justice joined.") (internal citation omitted).
125

126
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landmark decisions that have come in Crawford's wake, oftentimes agreeing
with a case's outcome, but on grounds that are not shared by any of his
brethren. 132
According to Justice Thomas, "the Confrontation Clause reaches
'formalized testimonial materials,' such as depositions, affidavits, and prior
testimony, or statements resulting from 'formalized dialogue,' such as
custodial interrogation.,,133 Under that standard, the DNA report in Williams
was viewed as non-testimonial because it was not prepared by a "witness" in
the historical sense, as it lacked the requisite "formality and solemnity
necessary to come within the scope of the Clause.,,134
Justice Thomas distinguished the reports in Melendez-Diaz (which were
sworn before a notary), and Bullcoming (which included a "certificate of
analysis"), from the lab report in Williams that was "neither a sworn nor
certified declaration of fact.,,135 Expressed differently, the certifications in
Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming were considered to be, in essence, affidavits,
whereas the DNA report in Williams, "in substance, certifie[d] nothing.,,136
This distinction, i.e., whether a lab report formally certifies its authenticity,
somewhat akin to the taking of an oath, was of constitutional significance
because such certifications "are functionally identical to live, in-court
testimony, doing precisely what a witness does on direct eXaInination.,,137
iv. The four Justices in dissent found the lab report testimonial in
nature
Justice Kagan was joined in dissent by Justice Scalia, Justice Ginsburg,
and Justice Sotomayor. 138 In their view, the expert's testimony should have
been withheld as testimonial hearsay because the case was functionally
indistinguishable from Bullcoming and Melendez-Diaz. 139 Further, the

132/d.

See Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2260 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Michigan v.
Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143,1167 (2011) (Thomas, J., concurring))(emphasis added);
see also Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 836-37 (2006) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
134 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2261-62 (Thomas, J., concurring) (internal citations
omitted). "Solemnity" is consistent with the historical principles behind the Sixth
Amendment because it reflects "the practices that the Confrontation Clause was
designed to eliminate," i.e., "the ex parte examination of witnesses" or its functional
eauiva1ent. Id.
13 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2260 (Thomas, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
136 Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
137 Id. at 2260-61 (Thomas, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
138/d. at 2264 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
139/d. at 2277 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
133
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dissent acknowledged the fragmented nature of the Court's disposition and
suggested that past precedent still controls. 140

B. The Aftermath o/Williams v. Illinois
Because the Supreme Court agreed on very little in Williams, the scope of
today's right to confrontation is very much unsettled. 141 Of course, certain
basic conclusions can be stated with certainty,142 but generally, Craw/ordhas
failed to instill the consistency it sought. 143 Thus far, courts have seemed to
follow the advice of Justice Kagan by continuing to treat Williams'
predecessors as controlling. 144

i. Williams' reverberations in Maryland
The Court of Appeals of Maryland's 2011 decision in Derr v. State
("Derr 1') appeared entirely consistent with Melendez-Diaz and
Bullcoming. 145 Following the Supreme Court's 2012 opinion in Williams,
however, Derr I was reversed and remanded for further consideration. 146
The facts of the case are strikingly similar to the facts of Williams. In
Derr 1, the State called a forensic DNA examiner from the FBI to provide
expert testimony during a 2006 trial in which Norman Derr was charged with
first-degree rape. 147 Over Derr's objection, the expert opined that the DNA
recovered from a 1984 rape victim matched the DNA recovered from the
defendant in 2004. 148
In 2011, the Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed the trial court and
ordered a new trial after concluding that the Sixth Amendment was violated
by the admission of the expert's testimony.149 However, in 2013, when
Derr's conviction on retrial was appealed to the Court of Appeals of
Maryland, Derr v. State ("Derr If') shifted course following remand and
140 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2277 (Kagan, J., dissenting) ("I would decide this case
consistently with, and for the reasons stated by, Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming.
And until a majority of this Court reverses or confines those decisions, 1 would
understand them as continuing to govern, in every particular, the admission of
forensic evidence." (internal citations omitted».
141 See supra note 11.
142 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52.
143 See generally id. at 60-68.
144 See, e.g., State v. Kennedy, 229 W. Va. 756, 770 (2012) ("[W]e construe
Williams with extreme caution and admonish lower courts to do likewise.").
145 422 Md. 211, 29 A.3d 533 (2011) (judgment vacated by Maryland v. Derr, 133 S.
Ct. 63 (2012».
146 See Maryland v. Derr, 133 S. Ct. 63 (2012).
147 Derr, 422 Md. at 219-20,29 A.3d at 539.
148 [d.
149 [d. at 253, 29 A.3d at 559.
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affirmed the defendant's conviction, fmding the DNA report not "sufficiently
formalized. ,,150
ii. The Marks test
Given the fragmented nature of the Supreme Court's decision, the court in
Derr II was tasked with interpreting the holding of Williams. lsl This
required applying the standard set forth by the Supreme Court in Marks v.
United States:
When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single
rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five
Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that
position taken by those Members who concurred in the
judgments on the narrowest groundS. IS2
The court read Williams to require "that statements be, at a minimum,
formalized to be testimonial."ls3 To arrive at this conclusion, the Derr II
majority considered "[t]he common point of agreement between the plurality
opinion and Justice Thomas's concurring opinion."ls4
Although the Williams "plurality did not clarify how to determine if a
statement is sufficiently formalized," it referenced "nearly the same
examples" as Justice Thomas. 155 Accordingly, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland adopted Justice Thomas's definition of"formalized.,,156
Judge Greene's' majority opinion was joined by three other judges.157
Judge McDonald concurred in judgment only, and Judge Eldridge was joined
by Chief Judge Bell in dissent. 1S8 Judge McDonald's concurrence agreed
150

See Derr v. State, 434 Md. 88, 105, 73 A.3d 254,264 (2013) (hereinafter "Derr

IF') ("Applying the narrowest holding of the plurality opinion and Justice Thomas's
concurring opinion in Williams we further conclude that the information relied upon
and presented as the basis for [the expert's] in-court testimony is not testimonial.").
151 Derr II completely disregarded the Williams "accusation" test. See id 434 Md. at
115, 73 A.3d at 270, n.15 ("[The Williams] plurality's assertion that forensic
evidence must be prepared for the 'primary purpose' of accusing a targeted
individual was expressly rejected by both Justice Thomas's concurring opinion and
the dissenting opinion. Because the plurality opinion's 'primary purpose' test has the
support of only four Justices it is not an aspect of the narrowest grounds leading to
the judgment of the Court." (internal citation omitted)).
152/d. at 114, 73 A.3d at 269 (quoting Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193
(1977)).
153 Derr 11,434 Md. at 114, 76 A.3d at 270 (emphasis added).
154/d. at 115, 73 A.3d at 270.
155/d. at 116,73 A.3d at 271 (internal citation omitted).
156 I d.
157Id. at 88, 73 A.3d at 254.
158

Id
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that application of Williams to the facts of Derr II required concluding that
the DNA report was non-testimonial, but questioned the validity of the
majority's application of the Marks standard. 159 Judge Eldridge's dissent
also criticized the majority's application of Marks .160 The dissent likened the
majority's opinion to Grutter v. Bollinger, where "the Supreme Court
seemed particularly concerned about applying the Marks test to conclude that
a portion of the opinion of one Justice, not joined by any other Justice,
represented the Court's holding.,,161 Because Justice Thomas's opinion was
not joined by any of his brethren in Williams, the Court's qualms in Grutter
were realized in Derr II.
iii. Derr II is limited to forensic reports
The Court of Appeals of Maryland decided Cooper v. State four days
after announcing its opinion in Derr 11. 162 The court again addressed the
admissibility of expert basis testimony in the context of DNA analysis,
finding a forensic report non-testimonial under Williams, as interpreted by
Derr 11. 163 However, whereas Derr II was unclear as to its scope, Cooper
limited its reach to forensic reports. l64 Outside of that narrow context,
therefore, an inquiry into a statement's testimonial character in Maryland
includes more than simply considering whether Justice Thomas would find
sufficient "solemnity.,,165

159 Derr II, 434 Md. at 139-40, 73 A.3d at 284 (McDonald, 1., concurring) (noting
that rather than construing the narrowest holding in Williams, the majority in Derr II
"latched upon the narrowest definition of 'testimonial hearsay"').
160 Rather than trying to discern similarities between the Williams plurality and
Justice Thomas, the dissent would have simply affirmed Derr I "as a matter of
Maryland law." Id. at 140-41,73 A.3d at 285 (Eldridge, J., dissenting) ("[B]ecause
there was no opinion by the Court in Williams, and probably no holding shared by
the Williams plurality and Justice Thomas, I would no longer attempt to reach the
Sixth Amendment issue in this case." (internal citation omitted».
161Id. at 140-42, 73 A.3d at 286 (Eldridge, J., dissenting) (citing Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003» ("If Justice Thomas's opinion in Williams did
represent the holding of the Court, it is difficult to understand why no member of the
plurality joined the Thomas opinion, or why Justice Thomas did not join a portion of
the plurality opinion.").
162 434 Md. 209, 73 A.3d 1108 (2013).
163 I d. at 233, 73 A.3d at 1122.
164 /d. at 234, 73 A.3d at 1122-23 ("In Derr II, we were able to discern ... an
applicable standard for determining whether forensic test results are testimonial."
(internal citation omitted) (emphasis added».
165 See supra notes 34, 135.
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IV. The Fifth Circuit shares the views of the five Justices of the
Supreme Court who rejected the "accusation" test

In December 2013, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit strongly rebuked the Williams plurality's "accusation" test, while also
succinctly describing the views of the "majority" of the Court, embodied in
the opinions of Justice Kagan and Justice Thomas. !66
In United States v. Duron-Caldera, the Fifth Circuit held that an
immigration affidavit was testimonial even though it was compiled in 1968
by the defendant's grandmother for purposes of an immigration
proceeding.!67 The government sought to admit the affidavit in a 2011
criminal trial to prove the defendant's alienage.!68 The government urged the
court to apply the "accusation" test to find the affidavit non-testimonial, on
the grounds that the declarant-grandmother did not intend to bear witness
against the defendant-grandson at the time the statement was made.!69
The court refused to adopt the '''accusation' test for a number of
reasons.,,!70 Among them, the test relied on an "overly-narrow view" of the
right to confrontation and was expressly rejected by a five Justice majority of
the Court.!7! Instead, the Fifth Circuit described a testimonial statement in
accordance with Supreme Court precedent, as one that is "made for the
primary purpose of establishing 'past events potentially relevant to later
criminal prosecution. ",172
To that end, the government argued that the affidavit was non-testimonial
because it was prepared for an immigration proceeding, and not for a
criminal trial. 173 The court, however, was not persuaded because the 1968
"affidavit was taken as part of a document fraud investigation," in which the
declarant negated personal guilt and shifted blame elsewhere.!74 Given the
substance of such a statement, the court held that a reasonable person would
view the affidavit as "potentially relevant" to a later criminal proceeding,
even if originally created for a non-criminal matter.!75
166 United States v. Duron-Caldera, 737 F.3d 988, 994 (5th Cir. 2013) (internal
citations omitted).
167 !d. at 993.
168 I d. at 991.
169Id. at 994 (noting that "it was not made to 'accuse'" the particular defendant of a
crime).

170 d.

I

at 994-95.
Duron-Caldera, 737 F.3d at 995 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822; citing
Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2714, n.6; citing Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1155-57; citing
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 310-11; citing Crawford, 541 U.S. 51-52). See also
sUfra note 78.
17 Duron-Caldera, 737 F.3d at 993.
174 I d. at 994.
175Id. at 994-96.
171Id.
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The Fifth Circuit also explained why the "accusation" test is inconsistent
with the Constitution's text:
The Sixth Amendment provides a criminal defendant ("the
accused") with the right "to be confronted with the witnesses
against him." The textual juxtaposition, therefore, is not
between "the accused" and his "accuser"; it is between "the
accused" and "the witnesses against him." To the extent [the
defendant] was a witness (discussed earlier), she "certainly
provided testimony against petitioner, proving one fact
necessary for his conviction" - his alienage. "The text of the
[Sixth] Amendment contemplates two classes of witnesses those against the defendant and those in his favor. . . .
[T]here is not a third category of witnesses, helpful to the
prosecution, but somehow immune from confrontation.,,176
In other words, if the Fifth Circuit would have found the affidavit nontestimonial on the basis that the declarant did not intend to bear witness
against the defendant, the declarant-grandmother would have equated to a
"third category witness," useful to the prosecution because the statement was
inculpatory against the defendant-grandson, yet "immune from
confrontation" because the defendant would be precluded from crossexamination. 177

V. 2013 CASE LAW OUT OF THE FOURTH CIRCUIT RELEVANT TO JAILHOUSE
PHONE CALLS

A. Jailhouse Phone Calls in the Wake of Hugh Wade's Case

There have been a few decisions in the wake of Hugh Wade's 2012 guilty
plea that have dealt with Crawford, but only one has dealt with the precise
issue as presented in Wade. Specifically, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit addressed the testimonial character of a non-testifying
co-defenClant's jailhouse phone call in May 2013.178
In United States v. Jones, the Fourth Circuit found statements on certain
jailhouse phone calls non-testimonial. 179 The facts of the case involved an
176 !d. at 995 (citing Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 313-14) (internal citations omitted)
(determing that the "accusation" test was essentially rejected by a majority of the
Supreme Court in Melendez-Diaz, when the Court refused to hold that forensic
analysts were "not subject to confrontation because they are not 'accusatory'
witnesses, in that they do not directly accuse petitioner of wrongdoing," again
because it would create a "third category witness").
177 Id.; see also Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2274 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
178 United States v. Jones, 716 F.3d 851, 855-56 (4th Cir. 2013).
179Id. at 853.
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alleged conspiracy to arrange fraudulent marriages between Navy sailors and
foreign nationals. 180 At trial in federal district court, three jailhouse phone
calls were admitted against Jones, contributing to his eventual fifty-two
month prison sentence. 181 Jones argued on appeal that his right to
confrontation was violated by the admission of certain portions of the
recordings. 182
One of the relevant phone calls was a three-way call between Jones, a coconspirator ("Otis"), and Jones' uncle ("Austin,,).183 Although Jones did not
challenge the admission of his personal statements on the recording in light
of the party opponent exception to the prohibition against hearsay, he
asserted that the statements of Otis and Austin were testimonial and
inadmissible. 184
The court disagreed and affirmed the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia, finding the statements of both Otis and Austin
non-testimonial because the requisite intent to "bear witness" was lacking. 185
According to the Fourth Circuit:
[S]tatements are testimonial when a reasonable person in the
declarant's position would have expected his statements to
be used at trial - that is, whether the declarant would have
expected or intended to "bear witness" against another in a
later proceeding. 186
The court also rejected the argument that an inmate's knowledge is
dispositive of testimonial intent. 187 Specifically, Jones argued that because
inmates are informed that their calls are recorded, a reasonable person in
such a position would understand the potential for its later use at trial. 188 In
response, the court explained that it was not the declarant's knowledge that
was dispositive, but rather the declarant's intent. 189 Describing the call as a
"casual conversation," the court found it clear that neither Otis nor Austin
intended to bear witness against Jones, "primarily" because the calls

180Id.
181 I d.
182 d.

at 855.

I
I

183 d.

Jones, 716 F.3d at 855-56 (citing Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A)).
!d. at 856.
186 I d. (quoting United States v. Udeozor, 515 F.3d 260,268 (4th Cir. 2008)).
187 Jones, 716 F.3d at 856.
184
185

188 d.
I
189 I d. ("Even if Otis and Austin were aware that the prison was recording their
conversation, a declarant's understanding that a statement could potentially serve as
criminal evidence does not necessarily denote 'testimonial' intent." (emphasis
added) (internal citations omitted)).
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"concerned Otis' emotional state and the prison conditions," and were also
self-inculpatory in nature. 190
Additionally, although not explicit in the court's opinion, the decision
appeared to account for Michigan v. Bryant because the Fourth Circuit
considered the prison's role in creating the recordings. 191 The court opined
that there are "significant institutional reason[s]" for recording jailhouse
phone calls, such as "policing its own facility by monitoring prisoners'
contact with individuals outside the prison.,,192
Even though the statements of Otis and Austin were non-testimonial, the
court made clear that the Confrontation Clause is to be applied on a case-bycase basis. 193 Therefore, Jones could be interpreted as leaving open the
possibility that certain jailhouse phone calls equate to testimonial statements,
provided their declarants bear the requisite intent.

B. The Unanswered Question in Jones: How Much Weight is Due to a
Statement Against Penal Interest?
One question that remained unanswered in Jones, just as it did in Saechao
and Castro-Davis, was the precise weight due to the self-inculpatory nature
of a co-defendant's statement in situations where there is an obvious intent to
bear witness by either shifting blame or negating personal guilt. 194 The case
of Hugh Wade would have provided the necessary fact pattern for an
appellate court to address such an issue, had it not ended in a guilty plea. 195
It is generally accepted that the self-inculpatory nature of a given
statement is at least partially relevant under Crawford, the rationale being
that a reasonable person does not make a self-incriminating statement when
under the impression that it would be available for later evidentiary use. 196
The courts in Jones, Saechao, and Castro-Davis all relied on such a factor in
support of their non-testimonial holdings. 197 However, all three decisions
were also influenced by the fact that none of the respective declarants
reflected an accusatory intention. 198 Thus, it is unclear whether the courts

190Id.

See Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143,1160-62 (2011).
Jones, 716 F.3d at 856. This effectively satisfies the primary purpose test of
Bryant from the perspective of the State, because the act of recording jailhouse
phone calls is allegedly for a primary purpose other than acquiring evidence for use
at trial; but see supra notes 34, 42.
193 Jones, 716 F.3d at 856.
194 See supra Part III.A, Part V.A.
195 See supra note 67; see generally supra Part III.B-C.
196 Udeozor, 515 F.3d at 268.
197 Jones, 716 F.3d at 856; Castro-Davis, 612 F. 3d at 65; Saechao, 249 Fed. App'x
at 679.
198 See generally Duron-Caldera, 737 F.3d at 993-96.
191

192
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would have viewed a statement against penal interest as dispositive, had
there been such an intent.
Although the Circuit Court for Baltimore City determined that codefendant Adams did not intend to bear witness against Hugh Wade, the trial
judge alternatively concluded that even had such an intent been present, the
statement was still non-testimonial because of its self-inculpatory nature. 199
Therefore, the circuit court's decision appears to have given more weight to a
statement against penal interest than to an intent to bear witness?OO

C. The Unanswered Question in Jones has Recently Been Answered
In December 2013, the Fourth Circuit announced its decision in United
States v. Dargan. 201 The case involved a co-conspirator's statement to his
cellmate while the two were incarcerated. 202 The statement was offered at
trial against the defendant ("Dargan"), who was not present at the time the
statement was made. 203 Following his conspiracy conviction in the United
States District Court for the District of Maryland, Dargan posited two
separate but related theories on appeal regarding the admissibility of the
jailhouse statement. 204
First, Dargan proffered that it was improper for the trial judge to utilize
the hearsay exception found in Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) to admit
the co-conspirator's statement as a statement against penal interest. 205 Next,
Dargan argued that the admission of the out-of-court statement deprived him
of his right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment. 206 Thus, the Fourth
Circuit was charged with separately addressing the statement's admissibility
on constitutional grounds, as well as under the rules of evidence?07
What is most noteworthy about the opinion is that the self-inculpatory
nature of the co-conspirator's statement was not included in the court's
discussion of Crawjord. 208 The court first thoroughly considered the
statement as a hearsay exception; the various factors that must be
established, typically geared to ensure reliability, were described before the
court concluded that the co-conspirator's statement constituted a statement
against penal interest under Rule 804(b)(3).209

199 Transcripts of Motions Hearing at 39, State v. Wade, (2012) (No. 2112730009).
200

See id.

201 United States v. Dargan, 738 F.3d 643 (4th Cir. 2013).
Id. at 646.
I d.
204 Id. at 649.
205 I d.
206 I d.
207 Dargan, 738 F.3d at 649; see also supra Part II.A.
208 Dargan, 738 F.3d at at 650-51.
209Id. at 650.
202
203
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After affirming the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland's application of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Fourth Circuit
addressed the defendant's Confrontation Clause argument. 2IO Consistent
with decisions such as Cox and Smal/s,2Il the court "noted, as a general
matter that 'statements from one prisoner to another' are 'clearly nontestimonial. ",212 More specifically, the statement was described as a
"jailhouse disclosure to a casual acquaintance," made in an "informal
setting" with "no plausible expectation of 'bearing witness' against
anyone.,,213
Despite the thorough explanation as to why the statement constituted a
statement against interest for purposes of an exception to the rule against
hearsay, the fact that the pertinent statement was self-incriminating was not
even referenced in the court's Sixth Amendment analysis. 214 This suggests
that the Fourth Circuit views a statement's self-inculpatory character as
negligible, if not completely irrelevant under Crawford.
This is also consistent with Jones.215 Only after thoroughly discussing its
reliance on the declarant's lack of an intent to bear witness did the court
mention in one sentence that the statement was also against the declarant's
penal interest. 216 While this may suggest that such a factor is at least
partially relevant, it is clear that under the views of the Fourth Circuit, it
would constitute error for a court to view a statement's self-inculpatory
character as dispositive, as was done in the case of Hugh Wade.217
D. Additional Conclusions That Can Be Drawn From the Fourth Circuit

If and when the Court of Appeals of Maryland is faced with an issue in
line with Hugh Wade's case, the court would have the option of considering
the recent views of its federal circuit court. Because the Fourth Circuit is
only persuasive authority and not binding on state courts, Maryland could
adopt portions of the standard and reject others, pursuant to other relevant
case law. 218
The following are conclusions that may be drawn from the Fourth Circuit,
in addition to the above stated reading of Dargan; however, as will be

Id.
211 See supra note 38.
212 Dargan, 738 F.3d at 650-51 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 825).
213 Dargan, 738 F.3d at 651 (citing Jones, 716 F.3d at 856).
214 See Dargan, 738 F.3d at 651.
215 See supra Part V.A.
216 Jones, 716 F.3d at 856.
217 Id.; see also supra Part I1I.B.
218 Davis v. Director, Patuxent Inst., 29 Md. App. 705, 713, 351 A.2d 905, 910
(1976) (citing Wiggins v. State, 275 Md. 689, 344 A.2d 80 (1975».
210
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demonstrated in Part VI of this article, the majority of said conclusions will
not be recommended for adoption in Maryland. 219
i. Knowledge is not dispositive of testimonial intent, but lack of
knowledge is dispositive of non-testimonial intent
A threshold question in Jones dealt with a declarant's knowledge.220 The
court held that the presence of knowledge does not make a statement
testimonial per se. 221 Specifically, the Fourth Circuit rejected the argument
that an inmate's "knowledge that he is being recorded is dispositive.,,222
Rather, such knowledge is a mere factor - and as reflected by the outcome in
Jones - a factor that can be overcome.223
Knowledge was also not dispositive in Washington v. Davis and Michigan
v. Bryant. 224 In fact, knowledge was a non-issue.225 Obviously, a reasonably
prudent person who calls 911, or who makes a comment directly to an
investigating officer, is expected to perceive the blatant governmental
involvement in that particular situation. Thus the declarant's knowledge was
not in controversy; it was a non-issue.
Relevant to jailhouse phone calls is the fact that knowledge is present in
cases like Davis and Bryant, in regard to a declarant's awareness of the
"governmental presence" at the time of a statement's making. 226 In neither
case was such knowledge dispositive. Therefore, it is possible that Jones,
Saechao, and Castro-Davis were correct in refusing to view the jailhouse
notification of recording as conclusive ofa declarant's testimonial intent. 227
Alternatively, Dargan suggests that a statement is non-testimonial per se
in the absence of knowledge, when a declarant is completely unaware of the
State's involvement in a statement's making.228 That is, when a person
makes an assertion to whom he or she believes to be a private acquaintance
without any governmental affiliation, that statement is non-testimonial as a
matter of law, even if the other person is in actuality a confidential informant
acting under orders to obtain information in furtherance of a future
219 The exception being the amount of weight due to a statement against penal
interest; as will be discussed, it is the suggestion of this comment that Maryland
should find the rationale of Dargan "particularly enlightening," in regard to an outof-court statement's self-inculpatory character. See infra Part VI.B.ii.
220 Jones, 716 F.3d at 856.

221Id.

I d.
I d.
224 See Davis, 547 U.S. at 828; Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1150.
225 See id.
226 Castro-Davis, 612 F.3d at 65; Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1150.
227 See Jones, 716 F.3d at 856; Saechao, 249 Fed. App'x 679; Castro-Davis, 612
F.3d at 65.
228 See Dargan, 738 F.3d at 651.
222
223
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prosecution. This conclusion is also congruent with the Court of Appeals of
Maryland's opinion in COX.229
ii. The predominate inquiry focuses on an intent to bear witness, which
is analogous to the "accusation" test
United States v. Jones stands for the proposition that the predominate
inquiry into a statement's testimonial character is whether there exists "an
intent to bear witness.,,230 This is not a novel consideration. The courts in
Castro-Davis and Saechao, while not doing so as heavily as the court in
Jones, also considered the intentions of the declarant in the making of a
statement. 231
Consistent with the Court of Appeals of Maryland's decision in Cooper v.
State, it appears that the Fourth Circuit also views Williams as limited solely
to Confrontation Clause inquiries involving forensic reports.232 Jones made
absolutely no mention of the fragmented decision, despite having had the
opportunity to do so. Jones very well could have cited the "accusation" test,
because a declarant who "expect[ s] or intend[ s] to bear witness against
another," oftentimes necessarily targets a "particular individual.,,233
VI. PROPOSALS UNDER THE 2014 RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION

Despite the manifest ambiguity in Justice Scalia's Crawford opinion, the
present state of confrontation is even more abstruse than it was in 2004.
Although Crawford sought to remedy the unpredictability of the prior
Roberts standard,234 decisions like Williams and Derr II reveal the mission's
utter failure.235
The remainder of this comment will make recommendations as to how
Maryland should proceed in its analysis of the Confrontation Clause,
particularly in regard to jailhouse phone calls. These proposals will consider
the case law available as of early 2014. Although the case of Hugh Wade
will be referenced and its outcome refuted, it is debatable whether the ruling
would have survived appellate scrutiny under the standards of 20 12.
See Cox, 421 Md. at 647, 28 A.3d at 697 (discussing Smalls, 605 F.3d 765, 77980). This may seem at odds with Bryant's mandate to consider the primary purpose
of the State in a statement's making; however, because the Court of Appeals decided
Cox after the Supreme Court's decision in Bryant, it may be argued that a lack of
knowledge is dispositive in Maryland irrespective of the State's role in a statement's
origin. See supra notes 34, 42.
230 716 F.3d at 856.
231 See supra Part lILA.
232 See Cooper, 434 Md. at 234, 73 A.3d at 1122-23.
233 See Jones, 716 F.3d at 856; Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2242 (plurality opinion).
234 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60-68.
235 See supra Part IV.
229

2014]

When Does Crawford Reach Jailhouse Phone Calls?

189

A. How Maryland Should Define a Testimonial Statement

After considering applicable Maryland and Supreme Court case law, in
addition to the recent views of the Fourth and Fifth Circuits, Maryland
should define a testimonial statement as one that is made with the primary
purpose of establishing facts of past events that are potentially relevant
prosecutorially, in which a reasonable person in the declarant's position
would foresee as being available for later evidentiary use. Hence, there are
two aspects to the proposed primary purpose inquiry, and while the two
prongs can be viewed as separate, they do at times overlap.
i. The evidentiary prong of the primary purpose test
For the evidentiary prong, Maryland should adopt the recent views of the
Fifth Circuit and the five Justices who oppose the plurality in Williams; i.e.,
whether a statement is "made for the primary purpose of establishing past
events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.,,236 This standard is
entirely consistent with the goals of Crawford and does not reflect an
element of accusation.237 This also coincides with Maryland precedent, as
the Court of Appeals of Maryland spumed the Williams plurality in Derr
11. 238
The Confrontation Clause applies to "witnesses against the accused.,,239
Thus the Fourth Circuit's standard is too narrow, as a declarant need not
"intend to bear witness" against another, so long as the testimony is useful to
the prosecution by establishing at least "one fact necessary for [a]
conviction.,,24o To be sure, qualifying as a "witness" for confrontation
purposes is not a tall task.
ii. The foreseeability prong of the primary purpose test
In addition to having a primary purpose that is evidentiary in nature, a
testimonial statement must also reflect sufficient foreseeability. The
common thread shared by the three "core classes" described in Crawford is
that they all involve scenarios where a reasonable declarant would perceive
the statement's potential for later evidentiary use,z41 In this regard, the
Fourth Circuit's standard is again too narrow. A declarant need not "intend

Duron-Caldera, 737 F.3d at 993 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822) (emphasis
added) (citations omitted).
237 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60-68.
238 See supra note 151.
239 See supra note 3.
240 Duron-Caldera, 737 F.3d at 995; cf Jones, 716 F.3d at 856.
241 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52.
236

190

University of Baltimore Law Forum

[Vol. 44.2

or expect" that a statement be later used; rather, a reasonable declarant must
merely foresee such potential. 242
B. How Maryland Should Apply the Sixth Amendment to Jailhouse Phone
Calls

i. An inmate's knowledge should be dispositive
The Court of Appeals of Maryland should not adopt the views of the
United States District Court for the District of Maryland. Instead, Maryland
should view an inmate's knowledge that jailhouse phone calls are recorded
as dispositive of a statement's testimonial character. Simply put, jailhouse
phone calls fall under Crawford's third "core" class of testimonial
statements, being "made under circumstances which would lead an objective
witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at
a later trial. ,,243
This scenario is distinguishable from Davis and Bryant, where the
declarant's knowledge was not viewed as dispositive. 244 There, the pertinent
statements were non-testimonial because their primary purposes were not
evidentiary in light of an apparent ongoing emergency.245 Thus the
statements were non-testimonial regardless of the declarants' knowledge, as
statements made in the course of genuine emergencies are for a primary
purpose in which the right to confrontation is not concerned.
In contrast, it is hard to think of a situation where a jailhouse phone call
would be made for a non-evidentiary purpose. Surely, the vast majority
would be expected to pertain to past events, and would not be for the primary
purpose of seeking emergency assistance. 246
Relatedly, the Fourth Circuit in Jones held that the primary purpose of
monitoring inmates' telephone conversations, from the point of view of jails
and prisons, is non-evidentiary due to "significant institutional concerns.,,247
Assuming the validity of this assertion, it is plausible that courts could
overlook an inmate's knowledge on these grounds. However, while Bryant
expressly authorized consideration of a "dual perspective,,,248 Maryland case
law has made clear that more weight is to be attributed to the perspective of a
statement's declarant. 249
Duron-Caldera, 737 F.3d at 995; cf Jones, 716 F.3d at 856.
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52.
244 See supra Part II.C-D.
245 See Davis, 547 U.S. at 822; Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1151-52.
246 See supra note 84.
247 Jones, 716 F.3d at 856.
248 See supra Part 11.0.
249 Cox, 421 Md. at 648-50, 28 A.3d at 697-99 (citing Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143). The
Fourth Circuit also advocates a declarant driven approach. Dargan, 738 F.3d at 649.
See also supra note 42.
242
243
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At the very minimum, Maryland should refuse to follow the First, Fourth
and Ninth Circuits' description of jailhouse phone calls as "casual"
.
between pnvate
.
.
250
Sure Iy, an Inmate
.
,s
conversatIOns
acquamtances.
knowledge of the government's presence distinguishes jailhouse phone calls
from other jailhouse scenarios.
In short, even if Maryland courts were to fmd jailhouse phone calls nontestimonial, the rationale for such a conclusion would be more credible by
simply acknowledging the distinction between cases like Wade and cases
like Cox, rather than trying to create an analogy where one does not exist.
ii. A statement against penal interest is not a factor that should trump
an intent to bear witness
The reality is that courts do not view knowledge on jailhouse phone calls
as dispositive, perhaps because it would just be too simple of an outcome for
a progeny of Crawford. Maryland will therefore most likely weigh other
applicable factors in addition to an inmate's knowledge, such as a statement
against penal interest and an intent to bear witness.
Under the fact specific situation involving a non-testifying co-defendant
in a joint criminal trial, blatantly accusatory statements are, oftentimes also
self-inculpatory.25\ This is because a co-defendant, in discussing another's
involvement in a crime, necessarily reflects personal knowledge of the
incident in which a co-defendant is also charged.252 Statements are
"intrinsically inculpatory to the extent they demonstrate knowledge of
'significant details about the crime. ",253
Maryland should find the Fourth Circuit's decision in Dargan persuasive,
insofar as a statement against penal interest is concerned.254 As with other
hearsay exceptions grounded in inherent reliability, consideration of a
statement against interest lacks textual support in the Sixth Amendment, and
is inconsistent with the crux of the Confrontation Clause, crossexamination.255
In Dargan, an appeal out of the United States District Court for the
District of Maryland, the Fourth Circuit concluded that a co-defendant's
statement equated to a hearsay exception as a statement against penal
interest. 256 Although such a consideration would have only bolstered the

See Castro-Davis, 612 F.3d at 65; Saechao, 249 Fed.App'x 678; Jones, 716 F.3d
at 856.
251 See, e.g., supra note 58.
252 Dargan, 738 F.3d at 649.
253 I d. (quoting Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 603 (1994)).
254 See generally id.
255 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60-68.
256 Dargan, 738 F.3d at 650-51.
250
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subsequent non-testimonial finding, it was completely ignored in the court's
Sixth Amendment analysis. 257
Ironically, in its hearsay analysis, the court considered whether the codefendant had anything to gain under the circumstances and at the time that
the particular statement was made.258 Specifically, whether there existed a
"motive to shift blame or curry favor" called into question a statement's
"self-inculpatory quality.,,259 Therefore, under the rules of evidence, an
intent to bear witness against another retracts from the inherent reliability,
and thus applicability, of a statement against penal interest.
Although federal and state evidentiary rules are immaterial in regard to
the application of constitutional rights,260 it is interesting to see the
interaction of the two factors, relevant to inquiries in both contexts. At a
minimum, it would seem to follow that where a non-testifying co-defendant
has an "obvious motive to shift blame or curry favor,,,261 a statement's se1finculpatory character warrants less weight, under either the rules of evidence
or the Sixth Amendment.
Despite the fact that Dargan disregarded a statement's self-inculpatory
nature in its Confrontation Clause analysis/ 62 Maryland caselaw has not. 263
While there are arguments that support simply following the Fourth Circuit
in this regard, at a minimum, Maryland should declare that a statement
against penal interest does not trump an "intent to bear witness," where it is
clear a co-defendant is attempting to negate personal guilt or shift blame
towards an accomplice?64
More simply put, where there is express notification of recording plus
evidence of an accusatory intention, a statement on a jailhouse phone call is
testimonial per se, even if inherently self-inculpatory.

257Id.

See supra Part V.C.
Dargan, 738 F.3d at 649.
260 See supra note 116. See also Crawford, 571 U.S. at 61 ("Where testimonial
statements are involved, we do not think the Framers meant to leave the Sixth
Amendment's protection to the vagaries of the rules of evidence, much less to
amorphous notions of "reliability. "').
261 Dargan, 738 F.3d at 649.
262 See id. at 649-51; but see Jones, 716 F.3d at 856.
263 Cox, 421 Md. at 651, 28 A.3d at 699 (quoting Dutton, 400 U.S. at 89); see also
Transcript of Motions Hearing at 39, State v. Wade, (2012) (No. 211273009).
264 This is not to recommend that Maryland adopt any sort of "accusation" mandate
in its Sixth Amendment analysis; this is simply to state that where such intent is
present, a jailhouse phone call is testimonial per se.
258 I d.
259
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iii. "Third category witnesses" are created when a statement against
penal interest is dispositive
Again, the general rationale for viewing a statement against penal interest
as non-testimonial is that a reasonable declarant does not make such a
statement when under the impression that it would be available for later
prosecutorial use?65 This concerns the foreseeability prong of the primary
purpose inquiry. The evidentiary prong is not at issue because the aboverationale does not pertain to criminal relevance, but rather subsequent
availability.
Arguing that a statement against penal interest is dispositive may be
construed as suggesting that a statement is not sufficiently accusatory for
confrontation purposes, as a declarant does not intend to bear witness against
another when a statement is also self-incriminating. 266 That argument,
however, was expressly rejected by the Court in Melendez-Diaz,267 and again
by the five Justices who opposed the "accusation" test in Williams. 268
The Williams plurality argued that DNA analysts were not "witnesses" in
the historical sense, in part because DNA analysis is an impersonal scientific
practice in which analysts compile reports without any sense of whether they
will "be incriminating or exonerating.,,269 The dissent and Justice Thomas,
however, rejected this perspective, reiterating that "the Sixth Amendment
contemplates [only] two classes of witnesses - those against the defendant
and those in his favor ... there is not a third category of witnesses, helpful to
the prosecution, but somehow immune from confrontation.'.27O
Expressed differently, the plurality posited that the lab report was nontestimonial because the DNA analysts did notforesee its later use at trial and
thus "did not intend to bear witness against a particular individual.',271
Clearly, the evidentiary prong was not at issue, as the report established facts
relating to past events and potentially relevant to criminal prosecution.272
265 Udeozor, 515 F.3d at 268.
266 See supra note 128; see also Duron-Caldera, 737 F.3d at 993-96.
267 129 S. Ct. at 2533.
268 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2274 (Kagan, J., dissenting) ("[I]n Melendez-Diaz, we
rejected a related argument that laboratory analysts are not subject to confrontation
because they are not 'accusatory' witnesses." (internal citations omitted».
269 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2244 (plurality opinion).
27°Id. at 2263 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 31314). See also supra Part IV.B.iv.
271 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2228 (plurality opinion).
272 That being said, the Williams plurality, however, did attempt to invoke the
ongoing emergency exception to establish a non-evidentiary primary purpose, but
this too was expressly rejected by a majority of the Court. See id. at 2243-44
(plurality opinion) (asserting that the DNA report was compiled for a primary
purpose of responding to an ongoing emergency because an unknown sexual
predator was at large at the time the report was compiled); but see id. at 2263
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In this regard, a statement against penal interest is akin to the
"accusation" test, in that neither suggests a lack of criminal relevance, but
rather pertains to foreseeability. The same can be said of the government's
failed argument in Duron-Caldera, where it was alleged that the defendant's
grandmother did not intend to bear witness against her grandson because she
did not foresee the use of her immigration affidavit forty-years later at a
criminal trial. 273
Herein lies the distinction between a statement against penal interest and,
for example, a statement made during a genuine emergency situation. The
former has an evidentiary primary purpose, whereas the latter does not. As
such, implication of the ongoing emergency exception, which was expressly
carved out of the right to confrontation by the Court in Davis, is nontestimonial because of its non-evidentiary nature. 274
A declarant is not a "witness" for confrontation fsurposes when a
statement is made for a non-evidentiary primary purpose. 2 5 For that reason,
even though statements made in the course of an emergency may in fact be
"helpful to the prosecution [yet] immune from confrontation," the pertinent
declarants are not "third category witnesses," as described by the Court in
Melendez-Diaz. 276
Statements against penal interest, on the other hand, when made by a codefendant while incarcerated pretrial, are typically made to establish facts
relating to past events.277 Thus their primary purpose is very clearly
evidentiary, and their testimonial character turns on foreseeability, just like
the government's argument in Duron-Caldera, as well as the Williams
plurality's "accusation" test. 278
In short, unless an explicit exception to the Confrontation Clause is
carved out for statements against penal interest, as was done with ongoing
emergencies, then the rationale in the case of Hugh Wade cannot stand. 279
(Thomas, J., concurring) ("[I]t strains credulity to assert that the police and
[laboratory] were primarily concerned with the exigencies of an ongoing emergency,
rather than with producing evidence."); id at 2274 (Kagan, J., dissenting) ("On their
face, the [ongoing emergency] decisions have nothing to say about laboratory
analysts conducting routine tests far away from a crime scene. And this case presents
a peculiarly inapt set offacts for extending those precedents.").
27 See supra Part IV.B.iv.
274 To clarify, such a statement is not considered "non-evidentiary" for failing to
establish facts of criminal relevance; rather, it is non-evidentiary because the
primary purpose of the statement is not for that reason. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 81415.
275 !d.
276 Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 313-14.
277 See supra note 84.
278 See Duron-Caldera, 737 F.3d at 992-93; Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2274 (Kagan, J.,
dissenting).
279 See supra Part III.B.
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Such an exception, however, would not find support alongside the other
exceptions to Crawford, which again are fundamentally non-evidentiary in
nature,z80 Accordingly, if such an exception were to be expressly carved out
by a Maryland court, it would undoubtedly be vulnerable to appellate
scrutiny.
iv. Factors grounded in inherent reliability should not circumvent a
defendant's right to confrontation
Furthermore, determining that a statement is non-testimonial because it is
against penal interest resembles the practices under the former Roberts
standard, in that a defendant's right to confront adverse witnesses turns on
judicial determinations of, in essence, the need for cross-examination. 281
This is precisely what Crawford sought to abrogate. 282 Justice Scalia
described cross-examination as a procedural guarantee of reliability, which
Roberts misconstrued as substantive. 283
To rely on a statement against penal interest as the basis for a nontestimonial finding would function as if the Sixth Amendment's aims were
that of substantive reliability. In Williams, the plurality cited the inherent
reliability of DNA analysis, arguing that it did not resemble the type of outof-court statements in which the Sixth Amendment's Framers were
concemed. 284 However, this interpretation was also rejected by a majority of
the Supreme COurt: 285
It is not up to us to decide, ex ante, what evidence is

trustworthy and what is not.
That is because the
Confrontation Clause prescribes its own "procedure for
determining the reliability of testimony in criminal trials."
That procedure is cross-examination. And "[ d]ispensing
with [it] because testimony is obviously reliable is akin to

See supra note 267.
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61-62 ("Admitting statements deemed reliable by a judge
is fundamentally at odds with the right of confrontation.").
282 I d. at 60-68.
283 See id. at 61.
284 See Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2243-44 (plurality opinion).
285Id. at 2275 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). Both Justice
Thomas's concurrence and the dissent cited Melendez-Diaz to reject the Williams
plurality's reliance on the reliability of DNA testing. See, e.g., id. at 2261 (Thomas,
J., concurring) (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61; Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 309-10)
("The Confrontation Clause does not require that evidence be reliable, but that the
reliability of a specific 'class of testimonial statements' - formalized statement
bearing indicia of solemnity - be assessed through cross-examination.").
280
281
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dispensing with a jury trial because a defendant is obviously
guilty.,,286
In other words, dispensing with cross-examination because DNA analysis is
reliable reflects an overly narrow view of the right to confrontation, similar
to that of the former Roberts standard.
The Williams plurality argued that DNA testing is inherently reliable
because there is no "prospect for fabrication," as it is "unlikely that a
particular researcher has a defendant-related motive to behave
dishonestly.,,287 However, this too was unequivocally rejected as overly
narrow, because "the typical problem with laboratory analyses - and [thus]
the typical focus of cross-examination - has to do with careless or
incompetent work, rather than with personal vendettas.,,288
The same logic applies to a statement against penal interest in the context
of jailhouse phone calls. The assertion that a declarant does not intend to
bear witness against another when a statement is self-inculpatory presents an
overly narrow interpretation of the Sixth Amendment. It assumes that the
sole concern of the Amendment's Framers was a declarant's devious intent.
Obviously, the Confrontation Clause is broader than that, providing the right
to cross-examine adverse witnesses in regard to much more than simply a
declarant's motives. 289
For example, other topics worthy of Sixth
Amendment protection include a declarant's perception, recollection, etc. 290
More fundamentally, the Crawford court made clear that it would be
inappropriate to preclude cross-examination on the basis of a selfexculpatory statement being found sufficiently reliable. 291 Specifically, the
Court traced the right to confrontation back to its English common law
routes and discussed the infamous 1603 trial of Sir Walter Raleigh:

Lord Cobham, Raleigh's alleged accomplice, had implicated
him in an examination before the Privy Council and in a
letter. At Raleigh's trial, these were read to the jury ....
Suspecting that Cobham would recant, Raleigh demanded
that the judges call him to appear. . .. The judges refused

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60.
Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2250.
288 Id. at 2274-75 (Kagan, 1., dissenting) ("Scientific testing is technical, to be sure;
but it is only as reliable as the people who perform it. That is why a defendant may
wish to ask the analyst a variety of questions: How much experience do you have?
Have you ever made mistakes in the past? Did you test the right sample? Use the
right procedures? Contaminate the sample in any way?" (internal citations
omitted)).
286

287

289

I d.

290

See supra note 95.
See generally Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60-68.
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. . .. [T]he jury convicted, and Raleigh was sentenced to
death. 292
Sir Raleigh's case was one on which the Framers relied while drafting the
Sixth Amendment. 293 It was also again referenced in Crawford, as evidence
of how Roberts had gotten away from the original intent behind the right to
confrontation:
The Raleigh trial itself involved the very sorts of reliability
determinations that Roberts authorizes. In the face of
Raleigh's repeated demands for confrontation, the
prosecution responded with many of the arguments a court
applying Roberts might invoke today: that Cobham's
statements were self-inculpatory, that they were not made in
the heat of passion, and that they were not "extracted from
[him] upon any hopes or promise of Pardon." It is not
plausible that the Framers' only objection to the trial was
that Raleigh's judges did not properly weigh these factors
before sentencing him to death. Rather, the problem was
that the judges refused to allow Raleigh to confront Cobham
in court, where he could cross-examine him and try to
expose his accusation as a lie. 294
Applying this rationale to the case of Hugh Wade again reveals that the
Circuit Court for Baltimore City was in error when it found Adams' selfinculpatory statement dispositive of non-testimonial intent. 295 While it may
remain subject to debate whether a statement against penal interest should be
considered at all under Crawford, one thing is clear - such a factor does not,
in and of itself, eviscerate one's right to confrontation.
v. Jailhouse phone calls "resemble" custodial interrogation
The strongest argument in favor of finding jailhouse phone calls nontestimonial is the lack of express questioning or "formalized custodial
interrogation.,,296 In addition to lying at the heart of Justice Thomas's
analysis, the Crawford Court also expressly described the testimonial nature
inherent in statements to police, as opposed to statements to private

292

I d. at 44 (internal citations omitted).

293

See id.

294

I d. at 62 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).

See supra Part lILB.
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52; Cox, 421 Md. 648,28 A.3d at 697 (interpreting
Supreme Court precedent to "strongly suggest that most, if not all, statements that
are not made to state actors are non-testimonial").
295

296
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acquaintances. 297 At a minimum, the relative lack of governmental
involvement makes jailhouse phone calls distinguishable from other
examples of "core" testimonial statements, such as confessions and grand
jury testimony.298
In Cooper, the Court of Appeals of Maryland applied Justice Thomas's
definition of formality and concluded that a DNA report was non-testimonial
because it did not "result" from a police interrogation?99 Clearly, applying
this rationale to jailhouse phone calls would also result in a non-testimonial
finding.
However, Justice Thomas did not require that testimonial
statements "result" from formal interrogation. 30o Rather, he defined a
statement as testimonial if it constitutes "formalized dialogue" that merely
resembles custodial interrogation. 30 !
Through the lens of Justice Thomas, therefore, it is reasonable to assert
that jailhouse phone calls are sufficiently formal for resembling custodial
interrogation, which again is accomplished via an inmate's knowledge.
Derr Irs adoption of Justice Thomas's definition of testimonial as the
standard in Maryland was quite puzzling because no other member of the
Supreme Court shared his views. 302 Subsequently, Derr II was limited solely
to forensic reports by the Court of Appeals of Maryland's opinion in
Cooper. 303 This effectively rendered the 2011 decision in Cox the applicable
standard in Maryland for all other confrontation inquires. 304
Once more, the argument in favor of finding jailhouse phone calls
testimonial under Bryant and Cox is that the calls are sufficiently formal
given their custodial context, generally made for the primary purpose of
recanting past events, rarely involve emergency situations, and are
objectively viewed as a scenario in which the statement's substance would be
available for later use at tria1. 305 Moreover, because inmates are aware that
their phone conversations are monitored, it can be said that certain

297

See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-53.

298

I d.

Cooper, 434 Md. at 231-36, 73 A.3d at 1121-24.
See Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2255-64 (Thomas, J., concurring).
301/d. at 2260 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[A]lthough the [DNA] report was produced
at the request of law enforcement, it was not the product of any sort of formalized
dialogue resembling custodial interrogation.") (emphasis added).
302 Derr II, 434 Md. at 141-42, 73 A.3d at 286 (Eldridge, J., dissenting) (citing
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003» ("If Justice Thomas's opinion in Williams
did represent the holding of the Court, it is difficult to understand why no member of
the plurality joined the Thomas opinion, or why Justice Thomas did not join a
portion of the plurality opinion.").
303 See supra Part IV.B.iii.
304 See Cox, 421 Md. at 648-49, 28 A.3d at 298-99.
305 See supra Part I1I.C.
299
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statements are made for the "primary purpose of creating a substitute for trial
testimony. ,,306
vi. Policy considerations
In Maryland, it is permissible in certain circumstances to try criminal
defendants jointly for purposes of judicial economy.307 However, if a
jailhouse phone call that is made by a non-testifying co-defendant and
incriminating against another co-defendant is deemed to be testimonial in
nature, then the Supreme Court's decision in Bruton v. United States is
implicated. 308 Though triggered solely by the Confrontation Clause/ 09 i.e.,
only if an out-of-court statement is testimonial, where applicable, Bruton
provides a prejudiced co-defendant with either a severance, limiting
instruction, or redaction of the pertinent out-of-court statement. 310
Without question, the ideal of judicial economy, though necessary in its
own right, pales in comparison to rights of constitutional dimension. 311
Further, the directives of Bruton cannot be said to be overly burdensome, on
either the State or the judiciary.
Admittedly, there is no clear-cut answer to the principle issue addressed
in this comment. For that reason, it would seem prudent for a court to tread
carefully, and in an abundance of caution elect to safeguard fundamental
liberties.

VII. CONCLUSION

Crawford aimed to remedy the unpredictability of Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence but its ambiguities have led to a state of confrontation no more
predictable than the former Roberts standard. In regard to jailhouse phone
calls, Maryland will have to decide whether to coin the calls "casual"
conversations between acquaintances, or properly acknowledge the obvious
governmental presence at play.
It is the recommendation of this author that Maryland refrain from
likening jailhouse phone calls to other, more private conversations in the
context of jails and prisons. In doing so, an inmate's knowledge of recording
should be dispositive of testimonial character, as the scenario resembles
306

Cox, 421 Md. at 651, 28 A.3 d at 699.

307 Conyers v. State, 345 Md. 525,553,693 A.2d 781, 794 (1997).
308 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
See supra note 44; Dargan, 738 F.3d at 651 ("[M]ore significantly, Bruton, is
simply irrelevant in the context of non-testimonial statements." (internal citation
omitted)).
310 See id; Castro-Davis, 612 F.3d 53, 65-66 ("[T]he Bruton rule does not apply to
non-testimonial hearsay statements.").
3ll See generally Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2242 (plurality opinion), 2256 (Thomas, J.,
concurring), 2272 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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"formalized dialogue," similar to statements made directly to State actors
during the course of an interrogation. Although the current trend has not
found such knowledge dispositive, at a minimum, where there is a clear
accusatory intent in addition to knowledge, Maryland should find a codefendant's jailhouse phone call testimonial, regardless of the statement's
self-inculpatory nature.

